There is a matter of dispute among the Rishonim if the prohibition against performing labor on Chol Hamoed (the intermediate days of Pesach and Sukkos) is Biblical (Rashi) or Rabbinic (Tosfos).

Our Gemora cites Scriptural verses illustrating that it is forbidden to perform labor during Chol Hamoed. Tosfos states that it is implicit from the Gemora that this is a Biblical prohibition.

Tosfos asks: It is permitted to work on Chol Hamoed to prevent an irretrievable loss or various types of labor; this would be understandable if the prohibition would be Rabbinic in nature, however, if it is a Biblical prohibition, where do we find distinctions in the types of work that some will be forbidden and some will be permitted?

Tosfos concludes that the prohibition against working during Chol Hamoed is only a Rabbinic injunction and the verses cited are merely Scriptural supports for this decree.

Tosfos asks from a Gemora in Avodah Zarah (22a) which states that there would be a prohibition of placing a stumbling block before a blind man (lifnei iver) by performing labor on Chol Hamoed. (One is forbidden from assisting another fellow to violate a prohibition, where the sinner could not accomplish the transgression without his aid.)

The Reshash explains Tosfos: The prohibition of lifnei iver is only applicable by a Biblical prohibition and not when it pertains to a Rabbinical injunction; accordingly, Tosfos asks why the Gemora states that lifnei iver applies by the prohibition of working on Chol Hamoed, when that is only a Rabbinic injunction.

Tosfos in Avodah Zarah (22a) states explicitly that the commandment of lifnei iver applies by a Rabbinic prohibition, as well. The Steipler Gaon explains a different Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 15b) that Tosfos is uncertain regarding this principle and it is indeed a dispute among two answers in Tosfos if lifnei iver applies by a Rabbinic prohibition or not.

This principle requires an explanation. Why should lifnei iver not apply by a Rabbinic prohibition? One is forbidden from providing flawed advice to his fellow (the Minchas Chinuch discusses if giving shoddy counsel violates this prohibition); every Rabbinic decree entails a Biblical prohibition of not swaying from the words of our sages.

What is the logic to differentiate between assisting someone to violate a Biblical prohibition or one that is merely Rabbinic?

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I was thinking...there's a klal that lifnei iver is asur, but not lifnei dlifnei...perhaps drabannan is considered lifnei dlifnei, because you are not transgressing the d'oraisa directly, since the Torah did not say specifically not to do this act. (Perhaps this is included in what chazal say that lo sasur is a 'lav sheb'clalos'.)
Perhaps the lomdus of lifnei dlifnei is that you did not assist is the performance of a 'maasah aveira'. When one is ovair a d'rabbanon, perhaps the act is b'etzem mutar; the aveira was 'not listening'. It was performed by one's heart and ears, not by one's arms and plow (lmashal).
I have more thoughts, but no time now. Yashr Koach.

Can it be any less than giving someone bad advice?

I always understood that the perushim of a)creating a situation where someone could sin and b)giving bad advice were two different aveira acts with separate gedarim derived from the same pasuk. Lchora giving bad advice is asur even if there is no aveira around. Can one bring a proof from one aspect of the mitzvah to the other? Hmm.

While it is true that some (michas chinuch 123, I think) maintain that there is no issur of lifnei iver by giving bad advice, but others hold that it is assur - accordingly, assisting one in violating an issur d'rabbanan should at least be assur because of that issur.

This is based on the fact that youre right and the gedorim are different.

I've always wondered about the shitas Tosfos in Succah that says that if you did not fulfill the rabbinic aspects of a mitzvah, you did not fulfill the mitzvah d'oraisa. Lchora such a thing is comprehensible only if you posit that the etzem act of, say, sitting rosho vrubo babayis is assur mid'oraisa, which might lead one to say (b'derech pilpul maybe) that the two machloksin (whether drabanans are m'akev d'oraisa and if there's lifnei iver on a drabanan) might be dependent on one another!

This is what I wrote on Sukkah Daf 3

Daf Yomi - Sukkah 3 - Tableless Sukkah

The Gemora concludes that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel argue in two cases. They argue as to what is the minimum size a sukkah can be to still be valid. Beis Shamai holds that the sukkah must be large enough to contain the person's head, a majority of his body and the table. Beis hillel maintains that it is sufficient even if it cannot contain the table. They also argue on a large sukkah that is next to a house and the table is in the house. Beis Shamai states that one does not fulfill his mitzva in this manner for there is a concern that he will be drawn after his table, which is in the house and Beis Hillel disagrees.

Tosfos concludes that the halacha is in accordance with Beis shamai regarding a small sukkah - it must be able to contain the table as well, however in a large sukkah the halacha is in accordance with Beis Hillel that the table is not required to be in the sukkah. The Rif and the Rambam disagree and maintain that the halacha in both cases is in accordance with Beis Shamai and the table must be in the sukkah.

The Pri Megadim 634:2 writes that if one ate in a sukkah where the table was in the house, he does not fulfill his mitzva at all, even min haTorah, for once the sages decreed that the table must be in the sukkah, this will prevent him from fulfilling his mitzva - period. He concludes that the person will have to recite another birchas shehechiyonu after he brings the table into the sukkah.

Right! That's exactly what I was referring to. The question is, through what lomdus is this possible? How can the rabbis, so to speak, reach into that perfectly good mitzvah d'oraisa and 'short-circuit' the mitzvah?
I thought to myself that perhaps when the rabbis make a decree, the lav of lo sasur somehow makes the decree part of the original mitzvah of yeshivas succah, and one that is m'akev...which caused me to say that the maaseh itself becomes assur.

Quote "I thought to myself that perhaps when the rabbis make a decree, the lav of lo sasur somehow makes the decree part of the original mitzvah of yeshivas succah, and one that is m'akev...which caused me to say that the maaseh itself becomes assur."

But Tosfos in Sukka holds that a Mitzva Habah B'Aveira is only Pasul Midarabanan

So you're saying that even if, as I wanted to say, the maaseh was asurah, that's not enough, because mitzva ba b'aveira is only a psul mdrabanan, and the Pri Megadim says you're not yotzei at all... I see. Do you think that this is a case of the rabanan being 'oker davar min hatorah bshaiv v'al taaseh'? What is the lomdus of the Pri Megadim?
Perhaps these issurim drabanan do not merely constitue mitzvah ba b'aveira, but even more...they are allowed to create tnaim that are m'akev in the etzem mitzvah. Therefore, the rabanan would not have to be oker the mitzvah, because there would be no mitzvah in the first place...huge chiddushim, but we're just trying to understand the Pri Megadim!

I was thinking that this maybe Tosfos to his Shita in Bava Basra 48b D"H tinuch. His Maskunah is that the Rabanan have a koach to uproot something that they deem to be not right. See over there that the Rabanan took away a Kiddushin and made it into a regular gift. Tosfos points out that you do not need that people are Mikadesh on the condition that the Rabanan want it. That's only if you need to uproot it later, but originally it was a good Kiddushin. But if it was not proper in their eyes in the first place, they can uproot it by themselves.

How I understand it is that every Maaseh that is not by itself something, but needs intent to make it that way. Like Kiddushin. All you have is a giving of money. What is it? It depends on intent. If given for Kiddushin it's Kiddushin. If it's given for a gift, it's a gift. So any act that you need to define it, the Rabanan can come along and define it the way they want to. So even if the doer had one intent, the Rabanan can define the act through a different intent.

Same by Mitzvos. An act of the Mitzva is only defined by the intent. Even those that say Mitzvos don't need Kavana agree that if you have intent not to Be Yoitze you're not Yoitze. So the act of sitting in the Sukka in itself is not a Mitzva, since you may have that act without being Mikayaim the Mitzva. Therefore the Rabanan have a right to define that act as a non Mitzvah.

The only thing I can't come up with is why this works? How does chazal learn that the Rabanan have the Koach to define an act that has two interpretations to their own definition? I'm still working on it.

I thought of a reason (maybe.) Like I wrote, that we're dealing with actions that can be defined two ways, and therefore the Chachumim have a right to define it whichever way they want. They can define the giving of money as a gift and not Kiddushin. They can define the act of sitting in the Sukkah as a regular sitting without having intended to do the Mitzvah and therefore not Yoitze.The question is how they are able to do the defining?

I theorized that once the Rabanan enacted that these acts will no longer be considered acts of Kiddushin and Mitzva of Sukkah, the Jewish world doesn't consider these actions either. Thus the whole world defines these acts as a gift and regular sitting. Thus, this guy that goes against this, even if he intends these acts to be Kiddushin or a Mitzva, we say that his Daas is not valid because Mivatel Daato Eitzel Kol Adam.

Wow! Tremendous chiddushim. You know, I think b'li neder I'll have a look a the Minchas Chinuch on lo sasur or perhaps Succah this Shabbos. I don't have access now to a S'dei Chemed. Perhaps he says something.

You fellows steered this topic into a slightly different discussion and covered a lot of ground. I just received a response from Kollel Iyun hadaf regarding my original question:

The Kollel replies:

Tosfos' case involves selling a field to a Jew who will till it on Chol ha'Mo'ed, because he does not accept the Halachah that prohibits doing so.

Allowing a person to sin by giving him a field is not really comparable to tripping a blind man, since the decision to work on Chol ha'Mo'ed lies entirely with the one who gets the field. He sins of his own volition.

Nevertheless, it is included in the prohibition since when the sinner sins, he causes permanent, spiritual damage to himself (barring an act of Teshuvah) via the field. The damage that is caused is not the sin - which was the choice of the sinner - but what he suffers afterwards due to the spiritual damage my field brought him by being plowed on Chol ha'Mo'ed.

An act prohibited by the Rabanim, though, is not inherently damaging to the soul. What damages the sinner is the fact that he did not heed the Rabanan. This is not a damage the field is doing, so the owner of the field does not transgress Lifnei Iver.

(A similar argument applies when one causes another Jew to unwittingly transgress a Rabbinic or Torah prohibition.)

Best wishes,
Mordecai Kornfeld
Kollel Iyun Hadaf

quote:

A similar argument applies when one causes another Jew to unwittingly transgress a Rabbinic or Torah prohibition.)

Someone help me here. Does he mean that if one causes a Jew to unwittingly trasgress, there is no lifnei iver on the etzem aveira, but rather on the spiritual damage done?
But isn't causing the person to sin b'shogeg precisely similar to tripping a blind man?
Is there then no case of being machshil someone that is analagous to tripping a blind man?

I assume he means that there cant be lifnei ever on the shogeg since its not an aveira, certainly when its on a d'rabbanan (nesivos) and its only the spiritual damage - im not sure if thats akin to tripping the blind man, which would be comparable to the etzem aveira.

Quote "An act prohibited by the Rabanim, though, is not inherently damaging to the soul. What damages the sinner is the fact that he did not heed the Rabanan. This is not a damage the field is doing, so the owner of the field does not transgress Lifnei Iver."

I find this to be Dakusdik and cannot understand why would this change the situation. If someone's not heeding the Rabanan is manifested by working the field, then the field is causing him the spiritual damage. It would be like saying that you may give a Nazir wine, since the drinking the wine is not really the prohibition, but rather keeping his word.

If he meant that there is a difference between an Issur Gavra and an Issur Cheftza, I don't see why work on Chol Hamoed is more an Issur Cheftza, it would seem that it's more an Issur Gavra not to do Malachos rather than the field being something that you can't work with.

Quote "A similar argument applies when one causes another Jew to unwittingly transgress a Rabbinic or Torah prohibition"

I think a proof that casing a Jew to do a Doraisa B'Shogeg is Lifnai Iver is Tosfos Avoda Zara 7b D"H Minayin that the reason you can't pass wine top a Nazir is because it's not something he's used to and he might forget and drink it. We don't worry usually about passing Issurim to regular Jews.

Not placing a stumbling block before the blind it one of the seventeen lavin the Chafetz Chaim enumerates that one speaking or being mkabel lashon hara would transgress, and that is clearly (lchora) an issur gavra.
I have listened recently to a few shiurim recently by Rabbi Frand on the subject of lifnei iver. In one of them he brings two shitas rishonim that if the person does not know he is transgressing, not only is lifnei iver midoraisa, but there is no ptur of trei avri dnahara. (The context is Rav Ahron Soliveichik"s (z'l) assuring allowing Conservative Jews to use a mikva tahara for their conversions.)

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________________________________________________________________

Re: Chagigah 018: Lifnei Iver on a d'Rabanan

avrohom adler <aneinu@sbcglobal.net> asked:
>> Why should lifnei iver not apply by a Rabbinic prohibition? One is forbidden from providing flawed advice to his fellow (the Minchas Chinuch discusses if giving shoddy counsel violates this prohibition); every Rabbinic decree entails a Biblical prohibition of not swaying from the words of our sages.<<

The Kollel answered:
>>Tosfos' case involves selling a field to a Jew who will till it on Chol ha'Mo'ed, because he does not accept the Halachah that prohibits doing so. Allowing a person to sin by giving him a field is not really comparable to tripping a blind man, since the decision to work on Chol ha'Mo'ed lies entirely with the one who gets the field. He sins of his own volition. Nevertheless, it is included in the prohibition since when the sinner sins, he causes permanent, spiritual damage to himself (barring an act of Teshuvah) via the field. The damage that is caused is not the sin - which was the choice of the sinner - but what he suffers afterwards due to the spiritual damage my field brought him by being plowed on Chol ha'Mo'ed.
>>An act prohibited by the Rabanim, though, is not inherently damaging to the soul. What damages the sinner is the fact that he did not heed the Rabanan. This is not a damage the field is doing, so the owner of the field does not transgress Lifnei Iver.
>>(A similar argument applies when one causes another Jew to *unwittingly* transgress a Rabbinic or Torah prohibition.)

avrohom adler <aneinu@sbcglobal.net> asks further:

A few comments on your answer:

(a) Quote: A similar argument applies when one causes another Jew to unwittingly transgress a Rabbinic or Torah prohibition.)

Do you mean that if one causes a Jew to unwittingly trasgress, there is no lifnei iver on the etzem aveira, but rather on the spiritual damage done?But isn't causing the person to sin b'shogeg precisely similar to tripping a blind man?Is there then no case of being machshil someone that is analagous to tripping a blind man?

I assume that what you mean is that there cant be lifnei ever on the shogeg since its not an aveira, certainly when its on a d'rabbanan (nesivos) and its only the spiritual damage - im not sure if thats akin to tripping the blind man, which would be comparable to the etzem aveira.

(b) Quote "A similar argument applies when one causes another Jew to unwittingly transgress a Rabbinic or Torah prohibition"

I think a proof that casing a Jew to do a Doraisa B'Shogeg is Lifnai Iver is Tosfos Avoda Zara 7b D"H Minayin that the reason you can't pass wine top a Nazir is because it's not something he's used to and he might forget and drink it. We don't worry usually about passing Issurim to regular Jews.

(c) Another comment:
Quote "An act prohibited by the Rabanim, though, is not inherently damaging to the soul. What damages the sinner is the fact that he did not heed the Rabanan. This is not a damage the field is doing, so the owner of the field does not transgress Lifnei Iver."

I find this to be Dakusdik and cannot understand why would this change the situation. If someone's not heeding the Rabanan is manifested by working the field, then the field is causing him the spiritual damage. It would be like saying that you may give a Nazir wine, since the drinking the wine is not really the prohibition, but rather keeping his word.

If you meant that there is a difference between an Issur Gavra and an Issur Cheftza, I don't see why work on Chol Hamoed is more an Issur Cheftza, it would seem that it's more an Issur Gavra not to do Malachos rather than the field being something that you can't work with.

Avrohom Adler, Cleveland OH
-----------------------------
The Kollel replies:

(a) You are correct.

The case of causing a person to sin which is indeed similar to tripping a blind man - or better yet, is similar to giving a person bad advice - is the case that the Toras Kohanim itself gives when defining Lifnei Iver: Telling a Kohen he is permitted to marry a Gerushah. Misinforming someone about a Mitzvah is equivalent to misinforming him about a business deal. Not so, when a person either gives an object to his friend which his friend *chooses on his own* to use for an Aveirah, or when a person feeds something that is Asur to his friend, causing his friend to unwittingly commit the Aveirah. (The latter is not even Shogeg - it is Mis'asek.)

(b) That is correct. In fact, we find often that causing someone to unwittingly eat a forbidden food is Lifnei Iver. One example involves Kutim, who tell us that they took off Ma'aser even though they didn't since they do not keep the Mitzvah of Lifnei Iver (Eruvin 37b etc.)

What I meant by the parenthetical statement is that the dichotomy between d'Oraisa and d'Rabanan exists whether one lends an object to his friend which his friend *chooses on his own* to use for an Aveirah, or whether one gives his friend something that is Asur which his friend *unwittingly* uses or eats.

(c) As you are certainly aware, the Minchas Chinuch asks your question and cites all of the references that you provided (Mitzvos #232:3, #343:4 - in the Mechon Yerushalayim edition), see also Pardes Yosef (Vayikra 19:14 and Bereishis ). They provide no answer to the question.

Allow me to explain my answer more clearly (with help from my son Yisrael): Lifnei Iver only applies when the sinner could not have committed the sin in question without the help of the "Machshil". This is called "Trei Evrei d'Nahara" (Avodah Zarah 6b). If a person does not have a field, he cannot transgress the Isur of working his field on Chol ha'Moed. Therefore, if work on Chol ha'Moed is prohibited by the Torah, by selling such a person a field I am allowing him to transgress a prohibition that he otherwise would not be able to transgress. This is Lifnei Iver.

However, if work on Chol ha'Moed is only prohibited by the Rabanan, the transgression is not "working a field", but rather "disregarding the words of the Rabanan." Even a person without a field can disregard the words of the Rabanan in many other ways. Therefore, by selling such a person a field I have not helped him transgress a prohibition that he otherwise would not transgress. That is why this is not Lifnei Iver.

(This applies to the first of the two scenarios of Lifnei Iver that I mentioned above (b). In the second case (i.e. causing a person to unwittingly sin), there is no Lifnei Iver by a d'Rabanan either for the reason I mentioned in my first communication, or because no Isur is done when a person transgresses a d'Rabanan b'Shogeg - the Nesivos you alluded to.)

For a beautiful discussion of the difference I pointed out between the transgression of a Rabbinic law (disobeying the Rabanan) and a Torah law (where the act itself is prohibited) see Meshech Chochmah, Devarim 17:11.

(d) The truth is, though, that Tosfos probably understood (for the reasons mentioned above, (a)) that causing a person to sin is *not* included the simple meaning of the verse Lifnei Iver. Rather, it is included in the prohibition based on some Ribuy (perhaps the word "Lifnei"). This inferred Isur Torah may be limited to causing someone to transgress a Torah prohibition, but will not include causing someone to transgress a Rabanan prohibition. (The Rabanan may not have instituted k'Ein d'Oraisa here for a number of reasons.)

Best wishes,
Mordecai Kornfeld


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Dear R' Avraham,

I see that you're bringing our arguments back and forth with them. Interwebsite Torah brings out Ravcha D'Shmatsa.

One thing I have about the Teretz is

Quote "Allow me to explain my answer more clearly (with help from my son Yisrael): Lifnei Iver only applies when the sinner could not have committed the sin in question without the help of the "Machshil". This is called "Trei Evrei d'Nahara" (Avodah Zarah 6b). If a person does not have a field, he cannot transgress the Isur of working his field on Chol ha'Moed. Therefore, if work on Chol ha'Moed is prohibited by the Torah, by selling such a person a field I am allowing him to transgress a prohibition that he otherwise would not be able to transgress. This is Lifnei Iver.

However, if work on Chol ha'Moed is only prohibited by the Rabanan, the transgression is not "working a field", but rather "disregarding the words of the Rabanan." Even a person without a field can disregard the words of the Rabanan in many other ways. Therefore, by selling such a person a field I have not helped him transgress a prohibition that he otherwise would not transgress. That is why this is not Lifnei Iver."

This would infer, that if the sinner can get a different item to do the sin with it would not be Lifnei Iver. This would mean, that if there would be one place in the other side of the river that the Nazir can have wine then there is no Lifne Iver.

In the beginning of Shabbos (3a) the Rishonim (Tosfos, Rosh, Ran) say that the reason there is no Lifnei Iver for letting someone take na object from your hands since they could get the object themselves. Why do they need that? Even if they couldn't get the object, they could be Moitzie other objects and be Oiver the Aveira (unless we're dealing with someone that doesn't have any access to any objects on Shabbos.)

If you're going to say that it's Lifnei Iver because he's interested only in this object, this guy is only interested in working a field on Chol Hamoed and not to eat a chicken and cheese sandwich.