B"H

Yes, Gila. But the foetus is stipulative upon its head being within the matrix of the womb. Here, we would save the mother's life over the child's. If, on the other hand, the child has put forth its head from the womb, we are not permitted to kill the one over the other. We let circumstances alone.

In the case of "Big Jack," obviously he has come to that effectual place of being an "equal" to the others in his bid for life. We could not now take this away from him because of some mishap. Only my opinion, but I might be wrong here.

David

The question is though: 'is one allowed to kill 1 person to save many lives?'

B"H
Gila,

There have been incidences where a Jewish life was delivered over to be killed in order to save the entire Jewish town from unnecessary slaughter. In the particular incident that I am referring to, the man whom they delivered over to be killed was a fugitive, and had rebelled against the king. Now as we know, "He who rebels against the king signs his own death warrant." מורד במלכות חייב מיתה
We cannot say the same thing about "Big Jack."

Moreover, in the case of "Big Jack," who says that by digging around the blocked hole where he has gotten himself stuck, the entire party will not be saved?

David

Quote "Well, we say rodef for a foetus which is endangering its mother's life, which surely has no intent to harm its mother."

If he would be a real Rodef, then even if he sticks his head out he would be a Rodef.
Interesting, The Shulchon Orech in CM 425:2 says the reason why when the head sticks out that neither one is a Rodef is because it's a natural occurrence. With Just that explanation we can say that Big Jack sticking his head in is not natural as childbirth and may be considered a Rodef. Or that naturally means that there is no intent, so now Big Jack is naturally stuck in the place. So is natural going on the act that's putting the person in danger or is it the end situation that's putting the person in Rodef.

Quote from R' DBA "There have been incidences where a Jewish life was delivered over to be killed in order to save the entire Jewish town from unnecessary slaughter."
This is based on a Yerushalmi in the 8th Perek of Terumos about Sheva Ben Bichri. That's only when the Goyim single him out and is a Machlokes Rishonim whether you need another condition that he's deserving of death like Sheva was. See YD 157:1 towards the end of the Rama.

By the fetus, why say "rodef"? Shouldn't it simply be "sakanas nefoshos" (danger to one's body)?

I guess that the fetus being a rodef permits a 3rd party (i.e. the doctor) to perform an abortion.

quote:

Originally posted by Rav Chaim:
Interesting, The Shulchon Oruch in Choshen Mishpat 425:2 says the reason why when the head sticks out that neither one is a Rodef is because it's a natural occurrence. With Just that explanation we can say that Big Jack sticking his head in is not natural as childbirth and may be considered a Rodef. Or that naturally means that there is no intent, so now Big Jack is naturally stuck in the place. So is natural going on the act that's putting the person in danger or is it the end situation that's putting the person in Rodef.

There is a time, in my most humble opinion, when one goes beyond what is permitted to be inferred by way of common analogies. The case of a child putting forth its head from its mother's womb has nothing to do, in our case, with "Big Jack" who is stuck in the exit-hole of that cave. The only similarity between the child whose head is no longer in its mother's womb and "Big Jack" is that both are viable, living beings, whose natural lives and subsistence no longer depends upon another. Just as we are not permitted to kill the child whose head has protruded from its mother's womb (even though he might jeopardize the life of its mother), so too, is it forbidden to kill "Big Jack," although he might jeopardize the life of his companions. In both cases, they are confronted with natural circumstances that have befallen them, without any malicious design or intent to harm another individual.

Sincerely,
David

quote:

Originally posted by Rav Chaim:
Quote from R' DBA "There have been incidences where a Jewish life was delivered over to be killed in order to save the entire Jewish town from unnecessary slaughter."
This is based on a Yerushalmi in the 8th Perek of Terumos about Sheva Ben Bichri. That's only when the Goyim single him out and is a Machlokes Rishonim whether you need another condition that he's deserving of death like Sheva was. See YD 157:1 towards the end of the Rama.

Rav Chaim,

I looked at the references you posted (Jerusalem Talmud, Terumah 8:4), and saw where Rabbi Shimon Ben-Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan disputed over whether or not a Jewish man who was singled out by gentiles could be extradicted to a gentile "court" in order to be killed by them. Rabbi Shimon Ben-Lakish says that he could be delivered unto them only if he had committed a crime like Sheva Ben-Bichri (who rebelled against the king). Rabbi Yochanan says that this was not necessary.

Both Rabbis were explaining the Boraitta as it appears in Tosefta Terumoth, chapter 7 (end), which by the way is also brought down in Midrash Rabba (Genesis Rabba 94:9).

In the Midrash Rabba (ibid.), we find that the woman who convinced her townsmen to extradict Sheva Ben-Bichri, did so only after being convinced, without any reasonable doubt, that failure to do so would result in the ensuant death of the entire Jewish population of that city.

The same Midrash brings down a story about another man, Ulla the son of Qishar, who had a death warrant upon his head, and who fled to Rabbi Yehoshua Ben-Levi for help. When the king had sent an officer to enquire about the man, Rabbi Yehoshua Ben-Levi persuaded the man to deliver himself up to the king, saying, "It was better that this man die, and not that the entire congregation should suffer on his account."

After having secured the peace, and the fugitive having been brought to justice, Eliyahu the prophet ceased making his rounds at the home of Yehoshua Ben-Levi. Rabbi Yehoshua Ben-Levi, feeling that things were not the same with him as before, began to fast about his sudden change of fortune. When he had completed thirty days of fasting, Eliyahu the prophet once again appeared unto him. Rabbi Yehoshua asked him: "Why hast my lord been late at showing-up?" He replied: "Am I friend of informants?" Rabbi Yehoshua retorted: "But is it not an oral teaching , 'A party of [Jewish] men to whom gentiles have said: Deliver unto us one of you,' etc." Eliyahu then answered him: "But is it an oral teaching of piety (chassidim)?! The act ought to have been done by someone else, and not by you." END.

Sincerely,
David

B"H

CORRECTION: Should have written "extradite" instead of "extradict."

David

It seems to me that the question hinges on the principle that all life is equal (same value).

So 1 life equals 4 lifes.

I don't think we are questioning the act of killing. Because if Big Jack would not survive either, than I would be surprised of anyone says that he should not be removed (blasted). Perhaps even he (who knows). So killing is an action or option that is available al pihalacha.

But I don't think that 1=4. There has to be a differeciation of values.

Suppose that on of the four people in the cave has the cure for cancer? This would be the opposite of, suppose that Big Jack was a criminal. Does the cancer curing life deserves a bigger value? and suppose that 4 were stuck to the hole (obvioulsly there is NO WAY to move them. Otherwise is a mute point.), and the cancer curing person has to blow them all up in order to survive. Again 1 against 4 in reverse.
Then what? So the question remain, do we assign a value to different lives?

Quote "I don't think we are questioning the act of killing. Because if Big Jack would not survive either, than I would be surprised of anyone says that he should not be removed (blasted). "

Of course its killing if you kill someone even seconds before he has to die.
Shabbos 151b as paraphrased by Kollel Iyun Hadaf

(l) Even on a weekday one may not close the eyes of one about to die - one who does so murders (it hastens death).
Quote "So the question remain, do we assign a value to different lives?"
The Gemaras in Yoma and Sanhedrin that I brought in these discussions don't make any difference. Rava didn't ask if he was a better person than him or a worse person. Neither does the SO in YD either. Everyone has a right to their life which you're not allowed to snuff out. Even a temporary life (Chayai Shaa) cannot be snuffed out to save someone who would live a long life. See Igros Moshe CM 2:73:2.

Quote "Of course its killing if you kill someone even seconds before he has to die.
Shabbos 151b as paraphrased by Kollel Iyun Hadaf

(l) Even on a weekday one may not close the eyes of one about to die - one who does so murders (it hastens death)."

I gather from this quote that killing is not allowed.

Whereas I stated that killing is an action that is allowed, of course depending on the circumstances. In the case of the rodef, be it a baby or anyone coming to kill you, you are allowed to kill him/her. So again, killing is a viable action alpi halacha.

Killing also has some permissible assumptions. For example, if a person comes to rob you by breaking into your house, you are allowed to kill him/her. If a father breaks into your house in the night, you are not allowed to kill him. But, if your son breaks into your house you are allowed to kill him.

You see form there, that within the permissibility of killing, there are differentiations.

In the case of father and son, is the potential intent. Meaning, a son is considered to be more likely to kill a father, whereas a father is unlikely to kill a son.

So I wonder still if 1=4 or super1=4.

I don't see the gemarot that Rav Chaim brings address that issue. I perhaps understood that those cases involved 1 to 1.

I can see that it is not up to us to decide who's to live longer than whom, since we don't know. A 100 year old man could potentially out live a young man. So exchanging lives on that value is undertandably wrong.

Do you give up one or few to save the many? the gemara seems to think that there is a difference. Even if it means looking for more than one reason to give him up for execution.

Quote "In the case of the rodef, be it a baby or anyone coming to kill you, you are allowed to kill him/her. So again, killing is a viable action alpi halacha."

I have already brought into this discussion that Big Jack is not a Rodef, since he's a victim of circumstance, like the baby breaching that stuck his head out. It's Rodef Min Hashamayim.

This is a quote of my original piece "
If he would be a real Rodef, then even if he sticks his head out he would be a Rodef.
Interesting, The Shulchon Orech in CM 425:2 says the reason why when the head sticks out that neither one is a Rodef is because it's a natural occurrence. With Just that explanation we can say that Big Jack sticking his head in is not natural as childbirth and may be considered a Rodef. Or that naturally means that there is no intent, so now Big Jack is naturally stuck in the place. So is natural going on the act that's putting the person in danger or is it the end situation that's putting the person in Rodef."

Quote" I don't see the gemarot that Rav Chaim brings address that issue. I perhaps understood that those cases involved 1 to 1.

I can see that it is not up to us to decide who's to live longer than whom, since we don't know. A 100 year old man could potentially out live a young man. So exchanging lives on that value is understandably wrong."

With that logic, one can last more than the four altogether. But it also includes the quality of the person. The Rabbi can't shoot the Ganuf either. It would seem from the Gemaras we can't qualify a life, thus life cannot be quantify either. We see the concept in MK 16b that Hashem said to Dovid that if your Mazal was switched with Shaul's I would kill many David's for 1 Shaul.

There is one point that I don't see being mentioned.

"you spot a hole elsewhere and DECIDE TO LET "Big Jack" out first."

He didn't go by himself. It was agreed to let him go first.