At a Shabbos table recently we were discussing whether Moshe Rabbeinu rationally thought through clearly whether to throw down the luchos.

This got me to thinking further... when one is very very angry they may think to themselves that they have never thought more clearly in their lives....

If perhaps one had the occasion to ask their rabbi a halachic question, and the question angered the rabbi (either it's basis was misunderstood, or just wasn't a good question) and the rabbi answered having thought through the problem in anger...

And this really was anger, not just a rabbi choosing to show anger yet not feeling it.

Would we say that rational thought was used, and the answer is binding?

Which is to say, if we think the answer might not be right, would we have to appeal that answer (through the halachic appeal protocol)? Or could we simply dismiss the answer as having been thought through unclearly due to anger, and its false feeling of clarity?

B"H

Rob,

Anger is one thing, and being moved with choler is another. A man can sometimes suppress his anger. But when that anger moves him to choler, it is something else.

The Talmud speaks very strongly against anger, which (everyone knows) can lead to regretted things. The Rabbis teach us:

"The angry man is controlled by many and variegated manifestations of hell."
כל הכועס כל מיני גיהנם שולטין בו

Rambam says that two things are very, very evil, and a person ought to distance himself from them at extreme opposite ends, viz., anger and pride.

In answer to your question, we have no way of determining how much wrath and anger actually affects the thinking process, and if a man's decision (such as in delivering a halacha &c.) has been tainted by his anger. Moshe Rabbeinu forgot a halacha because of his anger. This doesn't mean that every time a Rabbi is angry, he has forgotten a halacha.

Still, one should be cautioned about flaring-up in anger. I have personally found that the man who is the least provoked to anger is usually the best man in overall character traits, goodness, disposition, demeanor, &c. and is very pleasant to be around him.

David

quote:

I have personally found that the man who is the least provoked to anger is usually the best man in overall character traits, goodness, disposition, demeanor, &c. and is very pleasant to be around him.

Shalom David:

By the way, what is "choler"?

Is your quoted finding consistent with Pirkei Avos' teaching about easy to pacify and hard to anger?

If you were the sort of person who wanted to arouse empathy when discussing an issue, yet the pleasant to be around person who cannot be moved to anger, even in the face of hearing some impassioned about a horrific event, or worried about a horrific event soon to come that can still be avoided, would such a person's coolness to emotion still be pleasant to be around?

I'm not sure how to distinguish between that and the character of the pleasant target you describe.

quote:

when one is very very angry they may think to themselves that they have never thought more clearly in their lives....

If perhaps one had the occasion to ask their rabbi a halachic question, and the question angered the rabbi

I'd like to try to clarify my original question in hopes of eliciting some comments on track. I must not have been clear.

To some degree we must value "considered professional judgement" and out of respect for the authority of the position of the rabbi, whom we have made for ourselves, that -if- they consider a matter and render a judgement, then we are at least somewhat obligated to do as they have recommended.

My question has to do with what sort of considered judgement is included, and if any is excluded.

We know that we have to ask the right question in order to get the right answer.

But if the rabbi's considered judgement was based upon a misunderstanding of the question, do we consider that answer an obligation?

What if the reasoning turns out to be from the irrational clarity which the influence of anger can give, even if the questions' words were not misunderstood? Do we consider that rational reasoning because the rabbi did think about it before answering?

A rabbi once gave an example of how the halachic process works...

Suppose a person is not clear about whether a piece of meat was proper to eat, and they take the piece of meat and their question to a rabbi and ask, and they are given the answer that it is fine to eat, the animal was not sick, etc.

Suppose a second person is also not clear about a different piece of meat from the same animal, and the rabbi rules that the meat is not fit to eat, since the animal was most likely sick.

Apparently the first person's answer remains right for them, and they don't need to appeal the question's first answer - they can stick with it. If they already ate it, or served it to another Jew, they have done nothing wrong.

I'm asking if that type of approach works for where the reasoned consideration was through the blinding of anger.

For example, there is another story about how a rabbi was given a gift of something like a cylinder of tea leaves which had a gold coin at the bottom which he was not aware of.

That rabbi was subsequently sitting on a Beis Din and the one who gave the tea was one of the litigants.

Apparently the rabbi found himself biased to finding in favor of that litigant.

And this fulfilled what it says in the verse about bribery blinding the judge... even when the judge had not realized he had been bribed.

Perhaps we say that the anger in my example biased the rabbi with a similar blinding effect?

Would such a biased judgemet in either case need to be appealed? Or do we ignore it as an insult to justice / judgement, and nullify the result, such that it is as if the question had never been asked?

quote:

Originally posted by rob:

By the way, what is "choler"?

Is your quoted finding consistent with Pirkei Avos' teaching about easy to pacify and hard to anger?"

Rob,

Choler is intense anger, wrath, or irascibility. It can also be described as simply "losing one's temper."

As for what the Pirke Avoth says about being "easy to pacify and hard to anger," this is an exemplary nature, and one which we all ought to emulate. The opposite of this is what is described as not being good, viz., "easy to anger and easy to pacify." Even so, in the latter case, what would have otherwise been a loss for him, he has managed to salvage by his ability to make amends quickly.

As to your third question, it seems to me that you are talking about insensitivity (apathy, indifference, etc.) in a person which is not what I am talking about at all! The good person who is not quickly provoked to anger can also be a very lively, happy, energetic and sensitive person- all at once.

David

quote:

easy to anger and easy to pacify

Dear Reb David:

I think that of the 4 possibilities, I think the worst portion was easy to anger and hard to pacify. Did you mean to reference here one of the intermediate portions described in that mishna?

quote:

Originally posted by rob:

quote:

easy to anger and easy to pacify

Dear Reb David:

I think that of the 4 possibilities, I think the worst portion was easy to anger and hard to pacify. Did you mean to reference here one of the intermediate portions described in that mishna?

Yes, Rob,

I meant one of the intermediate portions described in that Mishnah. Kol Tuv!

David