Sam K,
You are introducing a new layer of argument. There is a different between a chupah not being a halachically valid marriage and living together as husband and wife being unrecognized as a halachic union.

So while a Reform chupah may not be halachically valid, once the two Jews live together as husband and wife and produce children, surely we would have all witnessed the de facto kedushin. So, a posteriori, they can be recognized as halachically husband and wife....surely? Isn't a Reform chupah just as good a "common law" marriage?

Rav Moshe's rational, by a civil marriage, since there was no religious ceremony, so we must suspect that maybe they had intent to do Biah to be married religiously. Rav Moshe says, by Reform or conservative, where the participants think that they're already religiously married through their ceremony, so they wouldn't feel any need to have any other religious marriage, so they never had intent to do Biah to make a Kiddushin.

Rav Chaim,
I'm sorry, I still don't understand your last post. Is "shacking up" a la common law halachically different from a Reform chupah a la civil wedding?

Quote "Is "shacking up" a la common law halachically different from a Reform chupah a la civil wedding?"

Kiddushin is dependant on intent. The former knows that he didn't do anything religiously, so we need to suspect that he had intent to make the Biah into a Kiddushin. But the reform marriage, the person thinks he's married Jewishly, so he'll never intend to make a Kidushin, since he's convinced he has it already.

Rav Chaim,
Your use of the term kiddushin is very specific to the Jewish paradigm. People can "shack up" without intent of becoming married, but in time develop the intent. Would their biah after that point become kiddushin? Conversely, surely a Reform Jew who believes his chupa is kiddushin, and intends it to be, can be granted it (de facto) as fulfilled?

The Rav Hai Gaon holds that kiddushin is Rabbinic. His source is a discussion in which the Gemara looks at power of the Rabbonim to nullify kiddushin (Keth 3:1). The power to abrogate is more difficult where kiddushin is by cohabitation, that’s why they resort to calling it illicit rather than for the purpose of kiddushin. Kiddushin by cohabitation is Chumash and can be abrogated only if the intent is not for kiddushin. Rav Menachem Solom Meiri, in his commentary on Tractate Kiddushim, argues that monetary kiddushim too is d’Oraita. Further, the kiddushin is really an acquisition by consent and very few people today look at marriage that way.

So for two Jews who “get married” in ignorance, with intent to be married, do fulfill kiddushin. The man usually gives a ring etc. But two Jews who “shack up” without intent of getting married are in an illicit situation. However, if at some point they decide to “get married”, then would their intent make kiddushin possible? Gemara (Deut 5:2) suggests that chupa may be valid without kiddushin.

quote:

Originally posted by Avi d'Israeli:
Sam K,
You are introducing a new layer of argument. There is a different between a chupah not being a halachically valid marriage and living together as husband and wife being unrecognized as a halachic union.

So while a Reform chupah may not be halachically valid, once the two Jews live together as husband and wife and produce children, surely we would have all witnessed the de facto kedushin. So, a posteriori, they can be recognized as halachically husband and wife....surely? Isn't a Reform chupah just as good a "common law" marriage?

Avi,

I would have agreed with you. What you say sounds perfectly logical and halachically sound except Rav Moshe didn't consider a Reform chuppah and kedushin to be valid. I wouldn't even consider arguing with the Posek Hador. If one reads anything from Iggros Moshe he can see the incredible depth and mastery that Rav Moshe had in all areas of halacha.

Sam K,
I'm not arguing with Rav Moshe. I'm not saying that a Reform chupa should be legitimized. I'm asking why a Reform chupa could not be considered simple (common law) cohabitation halachically....in which case it would be illicit anyway....until those involved want to rectify it later by desiring kiddushin. As I understnad this ruling, cohabitation is held in higher esteem than a Reform chupa. That doesn't sound right, Rav Moshe or not.

quote:

I'm asking why a Reform chupa could not be considered simple (common law) cohabitation halachically

Shalom Avi:

I think I heard this explained that the intention of the parties to a heretical service are implying that they think there is kedusha to that chupa.

Thus we cannot say there was intent to kedushin by using a process which is counter to Torah.

We would seem to have a similar problem to a conversion performed under the authority of a religious leader who's movement is counter to Torah Judaism -- even if the witnesses to the mikvah were considered proper witnesses in their community, their authority represents an afront to Torah, hence can anything in their authority within their institution be used for a Torah purpose?

I think there is a difference in chuppah or mikvah witnesses simply being Jews outside of any institution, and whether they are acting in an official capacity, and thus their office must be particularly proper in order for the Torah purpose to be fulfilled.

We had a story listed here at GY some months ago about how a yeshiva student with physical urges had a girlfriend, and was well tolerated at his yeshiva. He decided she should use the mikvah, perhaps in an attempt to make his situation less bad. However in the process what he was doing was seen as quite an afront to Torah, since he was trying to put a hechsher onto treif, so to speak. And the Rosh Yeshiva kicked him out of the yeshiva upon learning of this backwards reasoning of the student.

It seems to work out that no mikvah, or no non-rabbi-with-title-of-rabbi, is better than no mikvah, or a justice of the peace, when it comes to matters such as calling something unholy as equal to something holy.

Rob,
Your example with conversion is different. We have a problem in that there is rabbinic marriage and there is Torah marriage.....and one may be in conflict with the other. Technically (according to Torah) if people cohabit with intent, then they are married, as long as there are kosher witnesses. This is regardless of whether they got a civil or reform marriage. What I don't understnad about Rav Moshe is that when a Reform chupa is illegitimate while the Torah union can be possible creates a conflict.
The example of conversion you raise doesn't have such a conflict.

quote:

Technically (according to Torah) if people cohabit with intent, then they are married, as long as there are kosher witnesses. This is regardless of whether they got a civil or reform marriage.

Avi:

I think your assertion of this point regarding "reform" intent within the Torah's technicalities is where refinement is still needed.

Can you think of any other example in Torah where it says that something kosher can be brought about through treif means?

If there were a halachic authority who said that reform is no worse than parve/secular/civil, then your point of including civil and reform together would make sense.

But it seems that anything other than proper traditional Orthodox Torah Judaism, when called a Jewish authority, makes it counter to Torah values, and an afront to Torah, and therefore not in the category as simply civil / secular.

Or perhaps you could bolster your argument by pointing out gentile marriages or civil marriages in atheistic societies which have a yichud-like prohibition outside of marriage, and which use a symbolic roof over a couple's head in their marriage ritual? In which case you could say a reform chuppah is no worse than that, and doesn't mean to be a kosher-style wedding, its simply a civil ceremony from this other non-avoda-zora society!

Quote "The Rav Hai Gaon holds that kiddushin is Rabbinic"

I don't think this really has to do with our Shaila. We don't Paskin like this Rav HAi Goan.

Quote "But two Jews who “shack up” without intent of getting married are in an illicit situation."
That depends what their intentions was. Thus by a civil marriage we must *suspect* that his intention was for Kiddushin, since he knows he's not religiously married. (The key word is suspect, since we don't know what his intentions are, therefore we must suspect and not let them get remarried without a Get) A reform person we know his intentions is not for Kiddushin, since he's totally thinks he's completely married religiously.

quote:

Thus by a civil marriage we must *suspect* that his intention was for Kiddushin, since he knows he's not religiously married. (The key word is suspect, since we don't know what his intentions are, therefore we must suspect and not let them get remarried without a Get)

Unless I misunderstood, are you discussing getting married to each other (kosher) after a civil-only marriage requires a Get first?

Or is this if she wants to marry another man?

Quote "Unless I misunderstood, are you discussing getting married to each other (kosher) after a civil-only marriage requires a Get first?

Or is this if she wants to marry another man?"

Only if she wants to marry another man

Rav Chaim,
When you say "religiously married" do you mean kiddushin? From my understanding, within the framework of Torah, there is no such thing as "religiously married". A person is either married or he is not and there are several ways of achieving it legitimately. For now, I think we have exhausted the couple "shacking up".

Let me adopt your nomenclature and entertain the Reform chupa for a moment. You say the Reform Jew is not "religiously married" but I'm not sure that's the issue. He believes he is "religiously married" and had the intent of being "religiously married". The tradition of Moshe says he is not married, but because he believes he is "religiously married" and his intent was to be "religiously married", it's simply a matter of ignorance on his part. Does his ignorance nullify his intent?

quote:

he believes he is "religiously married" and his intent was to be "religiously married", it's simply a matter of ignorance on his part

I heard once in a kiruv context the following generalization, paraphrased:

By reform, there seems to be a lot of ignorance; but by conservative there seems to be an activism toward their own made up new traditions.

Perhaps the ignorance defense works by reform. If we switch the paradigm to conservative, or to a ritual performed by a woman using the title rabbi, where only the bride was wearing a kippah and tallis, and the man's conversion would be suspect to any Torah Jew -- could this perhaps be seen by Torah Judaism as a MOCKERY of a religious marriage?

And thus cannot be called a Jewish religious marriage even if the secular government recognizes is as a wedding perfrmed by someone with legal standing of clergy?

At what point does such a thing cross from ignorance to contempt for actual Torah religiosity?

Quote "He believes he is "religiously married" and had the intent of being "religiously married". The tradition of Moshe says he is not married, but because he believes he is "religiously married" and his intent was to be "religiously married", it's simply a matter of ignorance on his part. Does his ignorance nullify his intent?"

Of course it does. If someone reads the Mishnah in Kiddushin erringly and thinks that clapping one's hands makes you Mikudeshes, and does it for his "wife" are they married?

even in the secular world there are things that are binding and others that are not. If someone out if good faith signs a document that is not legal, it's not binding. that's why you higher competent lawyers to make sure everything is in order. If the lawyer is not too competent, you'll stand the chance that your action won't be binding. the same goes for rabbis. Let the buyer beware.

Rav Chaim,
We are probably misunderstanding each other. I'm not saying the Reform marriage is binding. We all know it's not.

I'm saying, while the marriage is not binding, can one say "after the fact" that there was never any intent, if the person were doing it in ignorance? True the Reform marriage is not binding. I'm not disputing that. You had said because of lack of intent there was never any kiddushin. I'm saying the Refom marriage is not binding but there was intent of kiddushin "in ignorance".

Therefore, how different would it be from "sacking up"...as far as intent is concerned? My argument is the validity of the intent, not the validity of the chupa. If I remember correctly, Torah judges the acts themselves (chupa), not what is going on in our minds (intent).

So if what's going on in our minds is "pure" in ignorance, even through the act itself is wrong, can we then come back later and say there was never any good intent because the act itself was wrong?

Quote "If I remember correctly, Torah judges the acts themselves (chupa), not what is going on in our minds (intent)."

It's a combination of both. If someone does Chupah and states specifically that he doesn't want it to make the nesuin, we're just going under a canopy for no reason. Or gives a ring with stipulation that it's not Kiddushin. Though in both cases the action was done, nether the less, he's not married. The same would apply if we know that he didn't realize that the action was binding and wasn't aware that he was performing Kiddushin or Chupa, it wouldn't work. Thus he needs the action and consent that the action should work in order that it should work. Without any of the 2 conditions there is no Kiddushin.

Rav Chaim,

I agree with everything you are saying. I think we are talking past each other. My issue is intent, not kiddushin. To put it differently, I understand that you are saying that when a chupa is not valid we have to go back and nullify the intent a posteriori. I'm saying the intent was valid a priori regardless of the validity of the final act of chupa.

It doesn't really matter, we agree that a Reform chupa is not valid, the finer argument about intent becomes moot.