Kashrut
In the Mishneh and Talmud, anyone can testify that the food is kosher including woman. The idea it is within their power to prove it if necessary. This hasn't changed as far as I know.
Organized kashrut, kashrut certificates, Bet Din involvement is first mentioned in the Shuchan Aruch for sugar that was delivered before pesach. It just grew like topsy into the mess we have today.

Aryeh Shore

B"H
Interesting point, Aryeh. In Yemen, there were no Kashrut Organisations; no Kashrut certificates; none of the competition that we find today! Rather, every Jew abstained from eating anything cooked by non-Jews, and relied strictly upon meats that had been "shechted" (ritually slaughtered) by a fellow Jew who had a license ("harsha'ah"). However, they would eat bread baked by non-Jews.
This does not have so much to do with the "Law of the Land" as it does with proper religious observance. The State is indifferent as to whether or not a Jew observes "Kashrus."

I received a reply about the original question posted in this thread. I will paste it here for our readers:

"My understanding of Dina de-Malchutha Dina is that the government must be just in order to be followed. So dictatorships that heavily taxed groups, while ignoring taxes on friends of the dictator, need not be followed.

While a just government that ruled against Jewish law must be followed. If ritual slaughter (sche'ta) were found to endanger the health of consumers. Then after all the legal appeals and public discussion, the State won their case, then public (for sale) sche'ta meat
would be prohibited and Jews could comply by not
eating meat or performing the sche'ta individually only for private use.

I see differences in the two examples above. (i.e. having Mezuzoth checked by local authority, and obtaining a license before acting as Mohel). It seems that both cases above are meant to regulate commerce and protect the public. You can do it for yourself. You can not do it for hire or for a living without meeting the additional state requirements.

It seems reasonable that the State could define
marriage and limitations, such as minimum age and prohibited marriages. But this should not really cause a problem meeting halachic requirements. I would have to think about [these] a little more to understand the issues and implications.

I speak only for my self and only to encourage
discussion of the issues presented.

Yehudah"

quote:

the State could define
marriage

What happens when (as it seems to have happened) that some states in the USA have tried to re-define marriage as something other than a man and a woman.

This does not { Yet!!! that is } prohibit proper marriages from taking place, of course.

But if a fairly just state so erodes such an important institution in such a way, is there any temptation for rabbis to vote with their feet and cease utilizing their government-recognized rights as clergy to sign marriage documents?

We can, much like in the meat example, choose to have only Halachic marriages which are never registered to the state. For families with two wage-earning spouses, the might be exempt from the income tax surcharge of dual-income families (called the marriage tax). A society which more than accepts couples living together without marriage and single motherhood really should have no problem with Jewish families being other than married according to civil law.

Do we _only_ resort to these passive resistance or whatever such a private meat shechting arrangements would be called when our actions are prohibited?

Or should we be proactive and use such measures to take a stand regarding something as unobtrusive as eroding a definition of what is marriage?

Who decides, and how do we decide, when to take such a stand?



Note: before any of this, liberal states brought in to medical insurance coverage requiremens "significant other benefits" - that folks living together but not (or not allowed to be) married were eligible to inlcude their non-married one "spouse" under family and dependent coverage.

However this was shown to be only for the purpose of promoting queer rights, and not the principle of extending family medical coverage...

It was asked if a couple who wanted to be married but were prohibited from marrying by the tenets of (at least one of) their religions, such as if a doubtful conversion in the lineage of one of them needed to be investigated or corrected, could this insurance principle apply?

And the answer came back in the negative... it was only for a specific agenda of a type of non-marriage living arrangement.

Jewish married has always been recognized according to halacha, not according to the law of the land. So same sex marriages mean nothing to the Jew.

quote:

Originally posted by David Ben-Abraham:
We also find the phrase, "Law of the Land" used in reference to a Government pulling down trees from another's property in order to build bridges, &c.

For your information: This is stated in Baba Kama 113b.

Not so simple.
The Rabbinical courts in Israel are part of the court system. Their decisions have the same effect as any other courts.
For example, Jewish law requires child support just to age six. However, the Rabbinical courts universally insist on child payments to age 16 as it is the law of the State of Israel.

A.S.

B"H

You've brought a very good example, Aryeh. Although the Torah requires a Jewish father to support his child until the age of five or six (I can't remember which), what a father does for his child afterwards is considered "charity." But most fathers, if they were to follow this rule quite literally, would be considered cruel to their children.

And what will we say about dividing the father's inheritance between his children? The Torah gives privileges to the sons, whereas the daughters do not inherit from their father after his passing, unless he had made prior stipulation in his last will and testament. But the secular law of the State (Israel) gives equal rights in inheritance laws to, both, sons and daughters. The rabbinical courts are subject to comply to the laws made by the State, and cannot rule only in favor of the sons of the deceased. Only if the daughters agree to give-up their part of the inheritance, will a son(s) have full-claim to his/their father's property.

Sincerely,
David

Quote "For example, Jewish law requires child support just to age six. However, the Rabbinical courts universally insist on child payments to age 16 as it is the law of the State of Israel."

This is not a proof for two reasons. First Rav Moshe Feinstein holds that whatever is the norm in society to support is considered as part of the Kesuvah (thus you can't take his support of Ma'aser.) Secondly, though the obligation of "child support" is until 6, if the father can afford it, the Beis Din can force him to pay for Tzidukah, as the gemarah says over there in Kesuvos.

Distribution of property.

Do no rely on probate (the default will written for you by the state). Make you own will. Besides just being good legal advice, it enables you to distribute the property according to the halacha. Especially in Israel where the laws of inheritance of property is somewhat complicated, e.g. at one point the parents had a one eighth interest in the apartment they bought for their children, it is definitely worthwhile. Furthermore, the law can be changed retroactively.

For those wondering how can the daughter be excluded from the property distribution, the logic is something like
1. The father is expected to give a certain portion of the estate as part of the marriage dowry.
2. The wife and daughter can prevent probate and live off the estate. The male children do not.

Aryeh Shore

quote:

2. The wife and daughter can prevent probate and live off the estate.

Under what authority can they do that?

And does this mean consume the principal as well as the investment earnings from the principal?

B"H

Concerning our original question, I have just received this reply:

"You are correct in your translation of the Gemara. I would hesitate to agree with your inference that this means it has been sanctioned by Heaven. I do not mean to say that it has not been sanctioned, I just do not think you can make that deduction from this particular phrase.

You then bring a number of examples which you feel are egregious. I would first like to try and explain how this law is and is not applied. I live in the USA, and most highways have a speed limit of 65 mph. That is the "law of the land". If I drive faster, I have broken "the law of the land". Now, if there was a law here that a business must be open on Shabbat, G-d forbid, then as a Jew I am not allowed to follow the "law of the land". It is in direct conflict with the Torah.

None of the examples that you cite fit into the second category. A father is not obligated to give away his "under-age" daughter, a man is not obligated to have more than one wife, there is no prohibition in demanding that a sofer have their mezuzot approved by a Council of the
Rabbinate, there is no prohibition to require a mohel to obtain a license from the Ministry of Health.

I am not discussing at all if the Israeli government should or should not be doing the above, but, in my opinion you cannot use the argument of dina demalchuta to say that the government is wrong in having these laws.

Rabbi Loschak"

There was recently a case in NY where a man betrothed his minor daughter without her knowledge. I believe the NY rabbinate was unanamous in threatening him with cherem.

A.S.

quote:

USA, and most highways have a speed limit of 65 mph.

Shalom David:

Would you please follow up with Rabbi Loschak and inquire if the following understanding, as a real case of determining the law of the land, is accurate?

Apparently the late Rosh Yeshiva of Ner Yisrael, Rav Yaakov Weinberg zt"l, wanted to determine the law of the land with respect to the Washington DC Beltway.

He determined that up until 70MPH, police to not pull over cars even if their speed is measured to be above the posted speed limit -- which is cosidered prima facia evidence of not driving safely.

He therefore concluded that the law of the land is 70MPH is tolerated --- the speed they actually choose to enforce.

Interestingly enough, we have highways which were designed for 75MPH or 80MPH travel, and thus had a posted prima facia speed limit of at least 10% less than that, given the law of the land presumption that RADAR is not accurate to more than 10%, and that drivers will exceed posted speed limits and set travel rates 10% higher than posted limits. But arbitrarily, against the will of the people, legislators had these posted speed limits arbitrarily lowered.

New Hampshire governor John Sununu was quoted in the newspaper in approxmatly 1988 I think as saying although we complied with Federal Highway Fund rules and changed our posted speed limits on interstate highways in New Hampshire, our law on the books remains simply that one must drive safely, and we consider 70MPH to be safe.

I am going by memory and surely paraphrasing a bit.

However this is two corroborating factors which indicate that to the secular way of thinking, laws are expected to be broken, and we can independently get to the same number by empirical observation of what is enforced or what a governor would surprisingly honestly say in an interview.

But I'll end with a question...

If I knew from first or second hand knowledge of the civil engineering of the highway that it was designed for safe travel up until 80MPH, and the stated rule of the land is merely to drive safely (and I am driving a vehicle which can be safely operated at such speed, and I reasonably believe it is safe for me to do so) ...

If a reasonably good advocate could present my case such that a real court under rules of evidence might find that I am actually legal... does that mean that I am fulfilling my technical obligations to obey the laws of the land to drive safely at such a speed?

Original message from Rob:

quote:

Would you please follow up with Rabbi Loschak and inquire if the following understanding, as a real case of determining the law of the land, is accurate?

Rob, I am pating his latest reply.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
I am not familiar with what Rav Yaakov Weinberg zt"l wrote about the
speed limit so I cannot comment.

It does appear to me that your argument about speeding not really being
speeding is sophistry. The law states that the speed limit is 65 MPH.
If you are going 66 MPH, then you have broken the law. Will you get at
ticket for speeding, probably not. But, if you were to get a ticket for
going 66 MPH, the judge would have to abrogate the law if he/she were
not to give a fine.

The fact that the roads are made for traffic to go faster than the
speed limit is, in my opinion, not germane to the law at all.


Rabbi Loschak

David,
Rabbi Loschak presumes that 66MPH measured is "actually" 66MPH (with zero random or systematic error). If the measuring gun is clocking with a 10% margin of error, then 66MPH may not be breaking the law. It is for this reason an officer or judge would probably let it go.
The issue is not so much a legal one but rather a technological one.

Actually I think that RADAR techology, especially when calibrated regularly with a tuning fork (I am not sure how its done) is quite reliable - far more accurate than initial court precedents apparently established for it.

Now variations in tire diameter and the technology of an analog speedometer, may actually give a greater error introduction, which should not be presumed to be intent to break the law.

quote:

Originally posted by David Ben-Abraham:
I recall reading somewhere (I think it was in Baba Metzia) where the Persian government of the time had made a law that all money found by a citizen of that State becomes the property of the Government. A certain Rabbi had found lost money where its owners had definitey despaired of ever retrieving it. The same Rabbi knew the teaching in the Torah that said that he who finds such money becomes the lawful owner. So, in total reliance on that teaching, he refused to relinquish the money he found, and did not give it to the Government.

This is a good example, in my estimation, where a law can be "side-swept" when it stands in direct contradiction to the Torah. But then again, one should do this when he knows he will not be caught by law enforcers.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The following reply has just been received by me from "Aish Com." These are his words:

* * * * * * * * * * * *

You are referring to the Gemara in Baba Metzia 28b. There it is not a royal decree, but rather gangsters who claim that they are taking the lost object to the king, because it is 'proper' to do so - (source: ibid; "Code of Jewish Law" C.M. 267:3).

However, if it was a proper law by the king or government, which is a decree for all citizens, we abide by the local law. (With monetary issues, it is not directly against the Torah, being that we may agree amongst ourselves to have a different monetary arrangement.)

The general rule for "Dina D'Malchuta" is that if it is a set tax, and a general rule that is applicable to all citizens (not a private law for a certain person), then we are obligated to follow the rules of the government.

Whether it applies to monetary issues only or everything (as long as it is not forbidden by the Torah), is a dispute in "Rma" C.M. 369:8).

We hope this has been helpful. With blessings for success,

Rabbi P. Waldman

But how would he explain Brachos 60a? Someone who found an object makes a Hatov Umaitiv, since it's good for him now, though eventually, if the government (Bey Malka, would hear about it, they'll take it from him.

quote:

Originally posted by David Ben-Abraham:
And what will we say about dividing the father's inheritance between his children? The Torah gives privileges to the sons, whereas the daughters do not inherit from their father after his passing, unless he had made prior stipulation in his last will and testament. But the secular law of the State (Israel) gives equal rights in inheritance laws to, both, sons and daughters. The rabbinical courts are subject to comply to the laws made by the State, and cannot rule only in favor of the sons of the deceased. Only if the daughters agree to give-up their part of the inheritance, will a son(s) have full-claim to his/their father's property.

Today, this matter was further clarified by Rav Aberjel (Av Beis Din of the Court at Beersheva). He said to me that in no way are the rabbinic courts in this country compelled to act contrary to the injunctions of the Torah in what concerns inheritance laws fixed by the secular State. Since the laws of the State give equal inheritance rights to, both, sons and daughters, the rabbinic court that meets daily with these kind of cases never forces the issue. Rather, it asks them (the children of the deceased) what they would like done with their father's inheritance. In this way, the court steers clear of all responsibility, and makes the decision rest squarely upon the shoulders of the heirs themselves (as if the sons, themselves, have relinquished their part in their father's inheritance by agreeing to share with their sisters in the inheritance). Once a settlement is reached between the heirs of the deceased, the court proceeds from there to perform the act of "kinyan" (purchasing the rights), in accordance with the laws of gifts. The male heirs are then requested to either say, or to write out a statement to the effect of: "I (we) agree to give a portion of the inheritance to the daughters of the deceased, allowing the sons and daughters of the deceased to have an equal share in the father's property."

If the sons of the deceased should insist that they, and only they, are entitled to their father's inheritance, the rabbinic court steps down and says to the heirs that they (the judges of the rabbinic court) are not qualified to adjudicate between the parties, in which case, they refer the heirs to a secular court of law.

So was it made known unto me today by the honourable chief Judge and Rabbi of the rabbinic court of Beersheva (Israel), Rav Aberjel.

Sincerely,
David Ben-Abraham

B"H

According to the Torah, a man's widow does not inherit the property of her deceased husband. Sons are the rightful heirs. (Even if a man's wife was the principal bread-winner in the family, the Sages have ruled that all her earnings legally belong to her husband, for the sake of "shalom bais." Yet, where he defaults in supplying her clothing and other material needs, she can lay claim to her own earnings, as if she has been recompensed by her husband's shortcomings.)

According to the secular laws of the State of Israel, a man's widow is automatically entitled to 1/2 of the property which her husband leaves at his passing, as if this property was her's anyway, by virtue of their having laboured together in the course of their lifetimes to build their home and fortunes. The remaining 1/2 of what was "supposedly" the only legal possessions of the husband while he was alive are then divided between the man's wife and their children (male & female). This gives the widow an additional share in her husband's property, whereas a total of 2/3 of the property of the deceased falls unto the widow! (According to modern Israeli law). The children are left to divide a mere 1/3 of what remained of their father's property.

Thus was it made known to me by Rav Aberjel (Av Beis Din at the court of Beersheva).

How can a frum father secure the rights of his sons and circumvent these laws, without having it come to a decision made by the court by way of default, and by the father's acquiscing (as it were) to the secular laws of the State? Any suggestions?

David Ben-Abraham