B"H

Hillel the elder taught seven hermeneutical principles, or what can simply be called, "the seven methods employed in deductive logic." (Avos de Rebbe Nosson 39:10). Rabbi Yishmael taught thirteen hermeneutical principles. Latter Rabbis have expanded these to include other principles of logic used in deriving lessons from the divine Law, hence: Torah. (cf. "The Iggeres of Rav Sherira Gaon," translated and annotated by Rabbi Nosson Dovid Rabinowich, ch. 6: The Talmud). I shall endeavour to bring here a few examples from each.

1) The most common of our principles of logic is what is called: קל וחומר (Kal ve-chomer). It can be translated as an inference from minor to major premise, or what some call, "A fortiori." Examples abound, all throughout our Talmud, of its usage.

The Torah teaches us that the owner of an ox is held responsible for his animal's actions, had it caused damage. The Torah, however, does not tell us whether or not the owner of a Canaanite slave is also held liable for the actions of his slave, had he caused damages. The Sadduccees (Heb. Tzaddukim) tried learning the answer to this question by way of Kal ve-chomer (an inference from minor to major premise), saying that slaveholders are responsible for the actions of their slaves. Thus, we find in Mishnah Yadayim 4:7, the following argument, as raised by the Sadduccees:

"...If, in the case of my ox or my ass (about which no commandments are laid upon me) I am responsible for the injury that they do, how much more in the case of my bondman or my bondwoman (about whom certain commandments are laid upon me) must I be responsible for the injury that they do!"

The Pharisees (Heb. Porushim), using another Kal ve-chomer, turned the tables on the Sadduccees, saying that slaveholders are not responsible for the actions of their slaves, but rather, the slave himself is liable for his own actions. The following was their argument:

"No! As ye argue concerning my ox or my ass (which have no understanding), would ye likewise argue concerning my bondman or my bondwoman which have understanding?!"

Elsewhere, we find a Kal ve-chomer teaching us why it is that we abstain from eating meat and milk together, even though the prohibition is not explicitly stated in the Torah. They said in Mekhilta (Shemos 23:19): "If it is wrong for us to merely cook meat and milk together, how much more then would it be wrong to eat them to together!"

2) Another one of our general principles of logic is what we find stated in the Talmud:

כלל ופרט וכלל אי אתה דן אלא כעין הפרט

(Translation)
"A generalization, followed by a specified detail, which is again followed by a generalization, one does not infer from its generalization any lesson other than that which is true of the specified detail."

One example of this principle of logic is explained in the Talmud (Kerisus 6b) as applying to the biblical verse in Shemos 30:34. There, it says:

ויאמר יי' אל משה קח לך סמים נטף ושחלת וחלבנה סמים ולבנה זכה בד בבד יהיה

(Translation)
"And the Lo-rd said unto Moses: Take unto yourself spices, stacte (i.e. any aromatic gum resin that exudes from trees), and onycha (i.e. Greek transliteration for "fingernail" spice, or what is called in Hebrew, "shecheles"), and galbanum; [even] spices, and pure frankincense; each [spice pounded] separately."

The generalization, here, is in the word, "spices," followed by specified details of "stacte" and "onycha" (the so-called "fingernail" spice) and "galbanum" (Ferulago galbanifera, or what is sometimes classified as Ferula galbaniflua). These aforesaid specified details are once again followed by a generalization, "spices."

This would mean that the "spices" in question can only be those which have similar qualities as those named in the specified details, such as which are true of gum resins (e.g. Mastic, or terebinth gum resin, myrrh, balsam, etc.), and such as which are true of the so-called "fingernail" spice, etc.

3) We find yet another teaching, called:
שני כתובים הבאים כאחד אין מלמדין

"One does not learn from two separate Scriptures when the end result comes to serve the very same function."

Here, we are in no need of examples, since the meaning implies, simply, that whenever there are two biblical verses that are identical, or which say nearly the same thing, they must each have a peculiar lesson, special meaning, etc. of its own. For there is nothing redundant, or superfluous, about verses repeated in the Torah. (cf. Hullin 61 a-b; Kiddushin 24a)

4) Another one of our principles of logic is this:
יש אם למקרא, יש אם למסורת

"There is a basis [for expounding a word], based on its tradition of reading (orthography); there is a basis [for expounding a word], based on its tradition of writing."

The most notable example of this is brought down in Sifra (Vayikra 11:33), and repeated in the Jerusalem Talmud (Hagiga 18b), as well as implied by Rabbi Akiba in Mishnah Sotah 5:2. There, we learn that where the Torah says in Levitucus 11:33-34, וכל כלי חרש אשר יפל מהם אל תוכו כל אשר בתוכו יטמא וכו' מכל האוכל אשר יאכל אשר יבוא עליו מים יטמא וכל משקה אשר ישתה בכל כלי וטמא וכו , "Any earthenware vessel wherein shall fall from them (one of the dead vermins), all that which lies within it shall be unclean, etc.," the word יטמא (Heb. Yitma), wherever it is mentioned in these two verses, was traditionally understood to have the connotation of "shall become unclean," seeing that we received the tradition of reading (orthography) which assigns a "chiraq" beneath the letter "Yod," and a "qametz" beneath the letter "Mim."

But if we shall re-arrange the vowel symbols assigned to that word יטמא, in such a way that it now reads "Yitamei," or "it shall render [a thing] unclean," we shall come-up with a different meaning altogether! This is permissible, seeing that we received the written law (Torah) from Moses when it carried no vowel markings whatsoever within it, and therefore we are able, of ourselves, to assign a "sheva na" to the letter "Yod," and a "patach" to the letter "Tet," and a "tzere" to the letter "Mim," which latter is also marked with a "dagesh," leaving us with a teaching that water or foods contained in such earthenware vessels, wherein a dead vermin had come in contact, are capable of conveying uncleanness to other things, besides being unclean of themselves!

It was for this reason, namely, this principle of logic, that Rabbi Akiba said:

" 'It shall become unclean,' and 'it shall render a thing unclean,' are both a teaching of the Law!" - Jerusalem Talmud, Hagiga 18b

- TO BE CONTINUED -

B"H

CORRECTION: I had inadvertently written: "Hillel the elder taught seven hermeneutical principles, or what can simply be called, 'the seven methods employed in deductive logic.' (Avos de Rebbe Nosson 39:10)."

The source should rather be: (Avos de Rebbe Nosson 37:10)

Sincerely,
David

B"H

5) Another one of the principles of logic widely used by our ancients is called בנין אב"Binyan Av." This can effectually be translated as "Prototypes."

For all practical purposes, there are two types of prototypes. The first is "a prototype drawn from one source." For example, the Torah speaks about the Passover holiday (Pesach), saying: (Shemos 12:16)
וביום הראשון מקרא קדש וביום השביעי מקרא קדש יהיה לכם, כל מלאכה לא יעשה בהם. אך אשר יאכל לכל נפש הוא לבדו יעשה לכם

"...and on the first day, a holy convocation, and on the seventh day, a holy convocation thou shalt have, in which no work shall be done. Only that which shall be eaten by any person, it alone shall be [permitted] to make unto yourselves."

Note here that the Torah does NOT speak about the other holidays (Shavuos and Sukkos), and whether or not it is permitted to prepare one's victuals, by cooking, on those other days. Yet, the above sanction to cook on the Pesach festival day has become the model (prototype) on which all other Jewish holidays are based, permitting cooking on the other festival days as well.

The second prototype is called, "a prototype drawn from two sources."

For example: In Vayikra 21:18-20 we learn about priests (that were born with certain blemishes) who are prohibited to officiate in the temple service. Among these blemishes, the Torah specifies - based on Rabbi Saadia Gaon's interpretation of the Hebrew - "he that is blind" (עור), "he that is lame" (פסח), "he that has a broken nose" (חרום), "he that walks in a skipping-like manner" (שרוע), "a man that is brokenfooted," ( שבר רגל), "a man that is brokenhanded" (שבר יד), "he that is a hunchback" (גבן), "he that has a cataract in his eye" (תבלול בעינו), "he whose body is effected with a dry boil that causes skin-flaking" (גרב), "he whose skin is effeced with Egyptian lichen" (ילפת), and "he whose testicle did not descend into its pouch at birth" (מרוח אשך).

The Torah, ostensibly, leaves other blemishes unnamed. Yet, by taking the blemishes named in reference to animals which cannot be offered as sacrifices upon the altar of G-d (Vayikra 22:22), we apply those same blemishes to the priests as well, meaning they, too, would disqualify a priest from officiating in the temple service had they suffered from those deformities. The latter biblical reference, although it speaks about defects in animals, has become a model (prototype) for priests as well, and where we find the additional defect of "that which has in its body a wart" (Heb. יבלת)

6) Another principle of logic is called גזירה שוה "Gezera Shovah," or what can be effectually translated as, "Drawing of analogies." In order to use this principle, one must first have a prior knowledge or notion about a certain thing, from whence he wishes to apply the same notion to something else that is currently unknown to him. For example: The Torah says concerning one's emancipated Hebrew bondman (Devorim 15:13): לא תשלחנו ריקם "Thou shalt not send him away empty-handed." Yet, it does not say exactly how much a Jewish slaveholder should give of his sheep, granary and vineyard to his ex-slave . The Talmud (Kiddushin 17a) brings down several ways of learning this by way of "drawing of analogies." Rabbi Meir says: ריקם ריקם, "empty-handed [is analogous with] empty-handed." Just as the word "empty-handed" used in connection with a man's firstborn son (Shemos 34:20) is five selas, so too, the word "empty-handed" used in connection with a slaveholder giving gifts to his ex-slave (Devorim 15:13) must be five sela's worth from each of his industry: sheep, granary and vineyard - for a total of fifteen selas!

Still, a man is not permitted to expound by using this principle of logic ("drawing of analogies") unless he had first received that exegesis from his Rabbis.

In the same Talmud (ibid.), we learn that Rabbi Yehudah had received from his Rabbi a different analogy. He learned that a slaveholder ought to pay the total equivalent of 30 shekels to his ex-slave, which is to be taken from the slaveholder's sheep, granary and vineyard. Rabbi Yehudah had learned: נתינה נתינה לגזירה שוה "Give is analogous with give." Just as the word "give" used in connection with a man's Canaanite bondman who had suffered death at the hand of your ox (Shemos 21:32) is thirty shekels in reparations, so too, the word "give" used in connection with a slaveholder giving gifts to his ex-Hebrew bondman (Devorim 15:13) must be thirty shekels, taken from that slaveholder's sheep, granary and vineyard.

7) Another principle of logic is what we call היקש or "correlative ideas." This can only be shown if two, otherwise different, ideas have been brought down in the same verse - implying that they are equal, or connected in some say. For example, in the Talmud (Kiddushin 35a), we learn from the Torah (Shemos 13:9):
והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת ה' בפיך

"...And it shall be unto you as a sign upon thine hand, and as a memorial between thine eyes, in order that the law of the Lo-rd might be in thy mouth."

The verse, here, has equated the entire Law (Torah) with one's wearing Tefillin (phylacteries)! Meaning, for all practical purposes, just as wearing Tefillin is a commandment that is governed by time (i.e. worn only during the day, excluding the Sabbath, etc.) and all women are exempt from wearing them, so too, all commandments that are time oriented, women ought to be exempt from doing them!

B"H

8) Another principle of logic, or dialectical exegesis, is what we call in Hebrew:

כל דבר שהיה בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד, לא ללמד על עצמו יצא, אלא ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא

"When a law is once laid down in general, and in another place a specification is given, it is stated specifically not for its own sake alone, but as applicable to the whole class."

For example, in Vayikra 7:20, we are taught:
"And the soul that shall eat flesh of those [animals] slaughtered as 'peace-offerings' (Heb. zevach hashelomim) which are [given] unto G-D, and his impurity shall yet be upon him, [even] that soul shall be cut-off from his people."

But, elsewhere, we learn that the Torah has already given general sanctity to all "hallowed things" (Heb. "kedoshim"). By way of definition, this same sanctity would apply to a man's "peace-offerings" as well. For it is written (Vayikra 7:37): "This is the law concerning the whole-burnt offering (olah), concerning the meal-offering (minchah), and concerning the sin-offering (chatas), and concerning the guilt-offering (ashom), and concerning the offering brought during a priest's duty of temple service (milu'im), as also concerning the peace-offering (zevach hashelomim)." Likewise, death by way of extirpation would be the punishment for anyone who came along and ate one of these offerings while his body suffered a pollution, as it is written (Vayikra 22:3): "Any man, from amongst all thy seed, who shall approach unto the hallowed things which the children of Israel shall dedicate unto the Lo-rd, and his impurity is yet upon him, that soul shall be cut-off from before Him."

Now when the aforenamed specification (i.e. "peace-offerings" in Vayikra 7:20) was taken out of the general class of all "hallowed things" to be addressed specifically, this was done in order to apply something which is known about it to the entire class of all hallowed things, namely: Just as "peace-offerings" are special in that they are hallowed things sanctified by the altar, so too, all things whose sanctity have been attributed unto them because of the altar would extirpation be the punishment for those who ate them while they were not in a state of ritual purity. This would, naturally, exclude those hallowed things that were dedicated to the temple in order to be sold, and their proceeds go to refurbishing the temple sanctuary (Heb. kodshei bedek habayis). In other words, if a person came along and ate a dedicated animal while that person's body suffered a severe or minor-grade of pollution, so long as the animal was not meant for the altar, he would not be liable to death by way of extirpation.

B"H

We have already observed how that Hebrew verbs, adjectives and nouns can all be changed in meaning by re-arranging their traditional vowel symbols. This way of exegesis is known as:
יש אם למקרא, יש אם למסורת

Some other examples of this dialectical exegesis can be found in other places of the Torah, viz., in Shemos 16:29 and in Shemos 22:9. In the former, we learn: "...let no man go out (יצא) from his place on the seventh day." If we change the traditional vowel markings from יֵצֵא to יֹצִא , the verse would then read, "...let no man take a thing out from his place on the seventh day." This teaching was alluded to by Yonathan Ben-Uzziel in his Aramaic Targum, ad loc.

Or, in the case of the latter, we learn: "For all manner of trespass...the cause of both parties shall come before the judges, etc." Yet, if we change the traditional vowel markings from דְּבַר-פֶּשַׁע to דִּבּוּר-פֶּשַׁע (the Hebrew letter Bet taking on the vowel "qubbutz"), it would then read, "For all criminal speech...the cause of both parties shall come before the judges, etc." (The school of Shammai, as we learn in the Talmud, practiced changing here the traditional vowel markings and would hold a man liable even for his vile thoughts!)

B'H

Are you therefore advocating that the traditional vowel sounds be changed? Or are you saying it is vile to do so? When you change a vowel sound and come up with another word that is not vile is it OK? Is it OK to do it in English too? Or do we lose track of our speech that way? Is there any purpose in replacing a vowel sound with many other vowels and come up with many different words to replace the one with the original vowel sound. Does it serve any purpose to change vowel sounds?

Raybin

B"H

Raybin,

I am not saying that the traditional vowel sounds ought to be changed. Rather, when expounding on a certain verse, it was permissible, by this mode of exegesis, to "stretch the meaning" of a certain text. This has always been understood as being totally legal and fitting with our dialectical principles of logic.

David

B"H

9) Another one of our principles of logic is what is called in Hebrew: מכלל ופרט (Mikelal u'frat), or what can be translated as, "[A lesson derived] from a general law to a particular instance." This same principle of logic is also known in Latin as "a priori." Whenever we meet with a biblical verse that is arranged, first, with a general law, and immediately followed by a particular detail, we can only apply to the general law what is expressly stated in the detail which follows, and no more. This rule differs from the principle of logic previously outlined and described in item # 2 (supra.), where a general law, followed by a specified detail, and again followed by a general law, teaches us that we can find other examples that are similar to the specified detail. But here, in the principle currently being discussed, this is not permissible. Only those things named specifically, and no more, are to be applied to the general law.

For example, where the Torah (Vayikra 1:2) writes:
אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן ליי' מן הבהמה, מן הבקר ומן הצאן תקריב את קרבנכם

"…When any man of you shall offer an offering unto the Lo-rd of those [domesticated] animals, " - "of those [domesticated] animals" being here the GENERAL LAW.

"…ye shall bring your offering from the cattle, and from the flock [of your sheep and goats]." – "cattle" and "flock [of sheep and goats]" being here the PARTICULAR INSTANCE.

The lesson to be had, here, is that ONLY cattle, sheep & goats can be brought as an offering unto the Lo-rd, but NOT deer, gazelle, antelope, etc. of those animals that are wild game, even if they happen to be clean beasts. Bird offerings are learned from a teaching of their own.

10) Another principle of logic is what we call: סמוכין (Semuchin), or "The juxtaposition of two verses." The proximity of two, otherwise different, subjects in the Torah suggests to us that if two themes have been arranged in our divine Law, one after the other, they must somehow be related. We find many examples of this throughout our Midrashic literature.

For example, the Rabbis have asked why do we find the entire section which treats on the suspected adulteress (Sotah), in Bamidbar 5:11-ff., coming right before the section that treats on the Nazirite-vow (Nazir), in Bamidbar 6:1-ff., and his forced abstention from anything that comes from the vine? They come to teach us that he who ever sees a suspected adulteress in her down-fall, should, by himself, abstain from drinking all wine!

B"H

11) Another one of our principles of logic is called מפרט וכלל (Miperat u'chlal), or what can be translated as "[A lesson derived] from particular instances to a general principle or law." This same principle is known in Latin as, "a posteriori." It is usually named alongside the principle "a priori" (supra. # 9), and is basically a reversal of that teaching.

Whenever we meet with a biblical verse that is preceded by some particular instance, or instances, followed by a general principle or law, we simply apply the general law as an addition to those same instances previously named. For example, in the Torah, Shemos 22: 9 (10), we find the following teaching:

כי יתן איש אל רעהו חמור או שור או שה

"If a man delivers unto his neighbour an ass, or an ox, or a sheep…" - The words, "ass, ox and sheep" being here the PARTICULAR INSTANCES. These are immediately followed by:

וכל בהמה לשמור

"…or any animal to keep, and it should die, etc" – The word, "animal," being here the GENERAL subject matter.

The lesson to be had, here, is that we apply the general subject matter to those particular instances already named – in our case, not only those animals from which men might derive immediate benefit, such as cows, sheep and donkeys, but any animal would fall under the same category, requiring its borrower to swear by oath that he was not negligent in his watch, but rather, the animal died of natural causes, etc.

B"H

We have previously discussed the principle of logic known as "juxtapositions."

One of the more popular lessons derived from this teaching is the 39 major types of labour that are forbidden to do on the Sabbath day. The Rabbis had learned this lesson from the juxtaposition of two subjects, viz., 1) that verse which speaks about the Sabbath (Shemos 35:1-3), saying, "You shall not kindle a fire throughout your dwelling-places on the Sabbath day;" And 2) those succeeding verses which speak about the construction of the Tent in the wilderness (Shemos 35:4-ff.).

The proximity of these two subjects teaches us that there is a connection between them, namely: The Sages had counted thirty-nine principal types of work or labour that were done by the people when constructing the Tent of Convocation (Heb. Ohel Mo'ed). Since the prohibition to light fire on the Sabbath comes immediately before treating on the subject of the Tent, we learn thereby that not even the high regard with which we give to its making is sufficient to override the honour due to the Sabbath! Wherefore, those same thirty-nine principal types of labour used in the Tent's construction, and any work which is similar to them, is not only prohibited on the Sabbath, but anyone caught doing such labours would be liable to the death penalty.

Another lesson learned by way of the juxtaposition of two verses is that which we find in the Mishnah of Yevamos 49a. Rabbi Akiba wished to define for us the word "bastard," since the Torah does not give us a definition of this word, but rather only a prohibition, saying "no bastard is permitted to inter-marry with the commonwealth of Israel."

לא יבוא ממזר בקהל ה

According to Rabbi Akiba, the verse in Devorim chapter 23 that says: "Let no man take [in marriage] the wife of his father, neither uncover the skirt of his father," and which is succeeded by: "No bastard is permitted to inter-marry with the commonwealth of Israel," instructs us about who is to be esteemed a bastard (mamzer). If a man went and slept with a woman whom his father had once lain with (even if that woman had only been raped by his father), the offspring of such connexions would be a bastard. This was Rabbi Akiba's opinion.

In reality, a bastard is anyone born from a forbidden union that would otherwise warrant extirpation, such as when a man is born from a woman who was already married to another man, or when he is born from a woman who had connexions with her son, or a woman who had connexions with her brother.

B"H

12) Speaking more on the lines of deductive logic, or reasoning, we also find what is called in Hebrew: מכלל לאו אתה שומע הן (Lit. "By saying, 'you can't do that,' you hear what you can do.") This form of logic can simply be called, "Things that are implied, or insinuated."

For example, in Devorim 23: 3, we learn:
לא יבוא ממזר בקהל ה
"No bastard is permitted to inter-marry with the commonwealth of Israel."

The Rabbis have said, "With the commonwealth of Israel he cannot marry. But he is permitted to marry into the family of proselytes, or into a family of other bastards, like unto himself. Even so, all offspring born of such unions will continue to bear the ignoble status of "bastards."

B"H

13) Another one of our principles of logic used in deriving lessons from the Torah is what is called גימטריא (Gematria). This word can simply be understood as "lessons derived from the numerical value of letters."

For example, there is a Jewish tradition that forbids burying the dead within the walls of any walled city. Pallbearers have always carried the brier outside of the walled city for burial. But just how far should one distance himself from the walls of the city? This is not stated explicitly in the Torah. Rather, the Rabbis have given instruction that all burials are to be held no less than 50 cubits from the wall of the city without. They learned this by way of "Gematria."

The Torah forbids a Jew from eating "nevela" or "tereifa," and says about the carrion of animals:

לכלב תשליכון אותו

"Thou shalt cast it unto the dogs."

The letter "nun" in "tashlichoon" was viewed as being superfluous. It was therefore interpreted to mean that, since the numerical value of "nun" is fifty, one must distance between himself and the dead at least 50 cubits.

So is it written in one of our Midrashim.

quote:

Originally posted by David Ben-Abraham:
B"H

The letter "nun" in "tashlichoon" was viewed as being superfluous. It was therefore interpreted to mean that, since the numerical value of "nun" is fifty, one must distance between himself and the dead at least 50 cubits.

So is it written in one of our Midrashim.

It is brought exlicitly as Halacha by the Shulchan Aruch in YD Siman 365 Seif 2 that "Graves should be distanced from the city by 50 cubits." This is based on a Mishna in Baba Basra 25a.

The Shach brings two reasons for this Halacha:

1. The view of the Ateres Zahav, that people should not constantly be able to see the cemetery, and this sight will cause them anguish.

2. The Shach himself disagrees with this view and he explains that the reason is the bad smell which emanates from the graves, and he writes that this is proven from the Gemara
there. (The Mishna mentions that not only graves, but also carrion and a tannery must be placed at a distance of 50 cubits from the city. Rashi cites the bad smell as the reason for this.)

B"H

CORRECTION: In my previous post, I should rather have written, "Pallbearers have always carried the bier outside of the walled city for burial." (I had inadvertently written "brier.")

Rebbe Yisroel,

Indeed, most of our oral teachings preserved in the Mishnah are written without telling us how these teachings were first derived. While some are "Halacha leMoshe MiSinai" and are clearly without dialectical origin, others were clearly derived from one or several of the hermeneutical principles outlined in this thread. This has been the task of the Gemara, viz., to show to us where these teachings are derived. The explanations we find in the Midrashim are not subordinate to those explanations we find in RASHI, or vice-versa. Perhaps RASHI relied on other Midrashic sources.

David

B"H

We find yet another Gematria used in the Talmud (Nazir 5a) to show how many days are considered the minimal requirement for one who takes upon himself, or herself, the Nazirite vow.

The Mishnah (ibid.) says: סתם נזירות שלשים יום

"A Nazirite vow that is vowed without specifying one's duration is binding for thirty days."

From whence is this teaching derived? By taking the numerical computations of four letters in the word, "yihiyeh," of the declaration found in Bamidbar 6:5, "…He shall be holy" קדוש יהיה.

The numerical value of "Yod" is 10. The numerical value of "He" is 5. These same letters are repeated, giving us the numerical computation of 30. Hence: The Nazirite remains holy for at least thirty days!

B"H

Again, if I might speak somewhat more about what we began to discuss under principle # 12, or what is called in Hebrew: מכלל לאו הן (Lit. "By saying, 'you can't do that,' you hear what you can do.") We have already noted how this form of logic can also be described as, "Things that are implied, or insinuated."

For example, in Shemos 21:8, we read:

אם רעה בעיני אדוניה אשר לא יְעָדָהּ והפדה

"If she has become withal unpleasant in the eyes of her master, for which [reason] he has renounced plans of taking her [unto himself], or of redeeming her..."

By saying, "for which [reason] he has renounced plans of taking her [unto himself]," we hear that, if he wishes, he can have her as his bride. Without this form of logic, we would not know that a slaveholder is empowered to marry his Hebrew maid-servant (with, of course, her consent), and is not required to pay any further dowry or the price of her betrothals. Her betrothals were included in her cost of purchase.

Thus do we learn in the Mekhilta of Rebbe Shimon bar Yochai, ibid., and thus is this teaching brought down in the Midrash Hagadol.